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ASSESSING THE PHYSICIAN'S STANDARD OF
CARE WHEN HIV IS TRANSMITTED
DURING ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
Donald G. Casswell*
I. ASSESSING DOCTORS As REASONABLE DOCTORS AND As
REASONABLE' PERSONS
In negligence law generally, whether a person was negligent is deter-
mined by assessing his or her conduct against that of the reasonable per-
son.' The reasonable person test works well in most cases in which
negligence is alleged. The judge or the jury, as the case may be, uses
common sense to assess the conduct of the defendant.
However, the reasonable person (reasonable judge, reasonable juror)
knows little or nothing about the practice of medicine and is incompetent
to assess a doctor's acts or omissions. That is, the reasonable person test
simply does not work in determining allegations of medical negligence.
Therefore, of necessity the law defers to medical practice and expert
medical opinion. Parachuted into the place of the "reasonable person" is
the "reasonable doctor". As was more elaborately stated in the Supreme
* Faculty of Law, University of Victoria; Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. I
would like to thank Sandra J. Harper, Barrister and Solicitor, McConnan, Bion, O'Connor
& Peterson, Victoria, British Columbia, counsel for Ter Neuzen, for her valuable com-
ments on an early draft of this article, and my research assistants, Wendy A. Baker, LL.B.,
University of Victoria, 1992, and Patrick Montens, LL.B., University of Victoria, 1993. An
earlier version of this article was presented at The Third International Conference on
Health Law and Ethics, Toronto, Ontario, July 1992.
1. Allen M. Linden: Canadian Tort Law (fourth edition), 1988: Toronto, pages 115-17:
"The measuring rod used in negligence law to judge an actor's conduct is the reasonable
person .... This is an objective standard, not a subjective one. An impersonal test is
employed, which eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the idiosyncrasies
of the particular person whose conduct is in question. If it were otherwise, negligence
would be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as
the length of the foot of each individual leaving so vague a line as to afford no rule at all,
the degree of judgment belonging to each individual being infinitely various." [quotation
marks omitted]
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Court of Canada:
2
What the [doctor] by his ordinary engagement undertakes with
the patient is that he possesses the skill, knowledge and judg-
ment of the generality or average of the special group or class of
technicians to which he belongs and will faithfully exercise
them.
Of particular relevance to the case I will consider in the next section of
this article, this medical standard of reasonableness includes keeping in-
formed about authoritative medical literature.' However, that obligation
certainly does not require a doctor to read every medical journal article.
As the English Court of Appeal put it: "... it would be putting much too
high a burden on a medical man to say that he must read every article in
the medical press."4
In exception to the medical standard of reasonableness, if a nonmedi-
cally trained person can understand the relevant facts of a medical case,
the law need not defer to medical practice. In Chasney v. Anderson,5 the
facts were that a five year old child died after a tonsillectomy when he
suffocated because a sponge had been left in his throat. The defendant
surgeon had used sponges without tapes attached, even though such
sponges were available, and had not kept a count of sponges used during
the operation, even though such a count would have been kept by the
operating room nurses upon his request. Medical opinion evidence at
trial indicated that the operation had been "performed in the same man-
ner as other surgeons perform[ed] it" and that it was "not customary" to
6count sponges. On this basis, the action of the deceased's father was
dismissed. On appeal, a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal re-
versed and held the surgeon liable in negligence. Commenting on the
expert medical evidence concerning customary practice, Coyne, J.A., one
of the majority Judges, stated:7
There is no question as to whether ... the operation itself was
conducted in a surgically skillful manner nor even whether or
2. Wilson v. Swanson, [1956] S.C.R. 804 per Rand, J. The most recent statement in
the Supreme Court of Canada to the same effect is Lapointe v. H6pital Le Gardeur, [1992]
1 S.C.R. 351 at 361-64 per L'Heureux-Dubd, J., for the Court.
3. See, for example, McLean v. Weir, [1980] 4 W.W.R. 330 (B.C.C.A.) at 335.
4. Crawford v. Board of Governors of Charing Cross Hospital, London Times, De-
cember 8, 1953, page 5 (Eng.C.A.).
5. [1948] 4 D.L.R. 458 (Man. K.B.), reversed in part [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 (Man. C.A.),
affirmed [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223 (S.C.C.).
6. [1948] 4 D.L.R. 461.
7. [1949] 4 D.L.R. 86-87.
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how sponges should be used in such an operation. The case in-
volves no difficult or uncertain questions of medical or surgical
treatment nor any of an abstruse or scientific or highly technical
character. It is the ordinary question of whether, as a matter of
reasonable care, certain obvious and simple precautions are re-
quired to be taken, something easily understood by ordinary
individuals....
Ordinary common sense dictates that when simple methods to
avoid danger have been devised, are known, and are available,
non-use, with fatal results, cannot be justified by saying that
others also have been following the same old, less-careful prac-
tice; and that when such methods are readily comprehensible by
the ordinary person, . . . it is quite within the competence of
Court or jury, quite as much as of experts to deal with the issues;
and that the existence of a practice which neglects them, even if
the practice were general, cannot protect the defendant surgeon.
In brief unanimous reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada subse-
quently agreed. In short, one need not be medically trained to know that
a sponge in the throat increases the risk of suffocation and death, that
counting sponges reduces the risk that a sponge is left in a patient's throat
and that using sponges with tapes attached reduces the risk that a sponge
is left in a patient's throat. In her leading textbook on Canadian medical
law, Madam Justice Ellen Picard states the matter as follows:8
The Supreme Court of Canada [held] ... that expert evidence as
to approved practice is not conclusive, especially where the con-
duct being questioned is not technical but relates to taking pre-
cautions. The [Court] decided that, as far as non-technical
matters are concerned, an ordinary person is competent to de-
termine what is a safe practice and held the defendant negligent.
II. A REMINDER IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGLIGENT TRANSMISSION OF
HIV DURING ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
In Ter Neuzen v. Korn9 the plaintiff patient alleged that she had been
infected with HIV during an artificial insemination procedure in January
1985 and that the infection was due to negligence on the part of the de-
8. Ellen I. Picard: Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada (second edi-
tion), 1984: Toronto, page 234.
9. No. C870065 (British Columbia Supreme Court, filed January 7, 1987). This action
was commenced in the Vancouver Registry, but the trial venue was subsequently changed
to Victoria. The Court of Appeal decision, not yet reported, is at [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362
(C.A.), Vancouver Registry CA014811. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant had breached sale of goods law by selling her HIV-infected semen.
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fendant gynecologist who performed the procedure. Ter Neuzen submit-
ted four bases for the allegation of negligence, namely:
1. Dr. Korn failed to screen the semen used in the artificial in-
semination procedure for HIV;
2. .He failed to make reasonable inquiries about the background
of the semen donor;
3. He failed to obtain the patient's informed consent in that he
failed to warn her of the possibility of HIV infection during the
artificial insemination program; and
4. He failed to discontinue the artificial insemination program
when he knew or ought to have known that continuing the pro-
gram entailed a risk of supplying HIV-infected semen to the
patient.
The case was tried by judge and jury in the British Columbia Supreme
Court. Dr. Korn admitted as a fact that Ter Neuzen had become infected
with HIV as a result of an artificial insemination procedure performed by
him in January 1985.10 Considerable evidence was led concerning AIDS,
HIV and HIV transmission. Some facts were clearly established. For ex-
ample, HIV testing, and in particular, HIV testing of semen donors, only
became available in Canada in November 1985.11 On the other hand,
there was conflicting expert medical opinion evidence as to what a physi-
cian performing artificial insemination procedures ought to have known
about AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission as of January 1985 and concern-
ing how an artificial insemination practice ought to have been conducted,
again as of January 1985, in particular with respect to semen donor
screening and follow up interviewing.12
The trial judge included the following in his charge to the jury:13
In deciding what risks should have been known to Dr. Korn,
evidence of medical experts of custom or general practice is one
factor to be considered, but it is not conclusive. It is open to you
as triers of fact to find the custom or general practice negligent.
Dr. Korn submitted that a question should be put to the jury asking them,
10. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 4.
11. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 7, 16.
12. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 20-83. Indeed, as of 1991, despite recom-
mended guidelines now in place concerning artificial insemination procedures, very differ-
ent and sometimes disturbing approaches still existed in fertility treatment in Canada. For
example. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies: Survey of Canadian Fer-
tility Programs, Ottawa: April 1993, page 28, reports that "some [fertility program] practi-
tioners and even one teaching hospital do not test sperm donors for HIV, as guidelines
recommend"!
13. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 134.
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in the event they found negligence, to specify the basis for such a finding.
However, the trial judge declined to put such a question to the jury. The
jury was simply asked to answer the following question: "Was there neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant which led to the infection suffered by
the plaintiff?" On November 20, 1991, the jury answered, "Yes", and as-
sessed damages of almost $900,000.
While the jury found Dr. Korn negligent, it is impossible to know the
precise basis for that finding since they were not asked that question.
Further, in Canadian practice it is not permitted to question jurors out of
court concerning the reasons for their verdict. However, following the
verdict it was widely speculated in the media that the basis for the jury's
finding of negligence, or at least part of the basis for that finding, must
have been Dr. Korn's admission at trial that. he was not aware in early
1985 of a letter to the editor published in the New England Journal of
Medicine on October 27, 1983.14 That letter was written by Dr. Laurene
Mascola of the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, Bryan
Colwell of Harvard University and Janet A. Couch of the University of
Georgia. The letter, published under the title, Should Sperm Donors Be
Screened for Sexually Transmitted Diseases?, suggested that "the agent
responsible for the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome" might "possi-
bly" be transmitted in semen. My purpose in this article is to examine the
reasonableness of the speculation that the jury must have given weight to
Dr. Korn's ignorance of this letter.
As an example of the reaction to the jury's verdict, consider the follow-
ing written by a Vancouver family physician, Dr. Gabor Matd, and pub-
lished in The Vancouver Sun, on February 15, 1992:15
The jury decision that a Vancouver gynecologist was negligent in
the case of a patient who became infected with the AIDS virus
illustrates the irrationality of negligence litigation....
As for the New England Journal letter, it presented only a
theory....
It should have given pause to anyone who read it, but, as one of
its authors, Dr. Laurene Mascola, said at the trial, Korn could
not be blamed for not having seen it.
It is frightening to think that the jury believed doctors must be
familiar with every letter in every publication.
I subscribe to the Journal: it is one of many publications to land
14. At page 1058 of Journal.
15. At page E9, under the title "Medical Letter: When lawyers and doctors spar, justice
often suffers".
1994]
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on my desk every week. I consider myself lucky when I can
read some of the major articles of specific interest to me, let
alone absorb all the arguments in the letters section.
Is it, however, reasonable to conclude that the jury held Dr. Korn negli-
gent for not being familiar with one letter to the editor in one medical
journal? I submit that it is not. I apply to the fact situation in Ter Neuzen
v. Korn the reasonable doctor and reasonable person analyses I intro-
duced in the first section of this article. Since Ter Neuzen alleged negli-
gence against a medical professional, Dr. Korn, the standard used to
assess his conduct is the reasonable doctor test. Certainly, accepted med-
ical practice does not require Dr. Korn to be aware of every letter to the
editor published in every medical journal, even the New England Journal
of Medicine. In this regard, Dr. Mat was entirely correct. However, as
the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in Chasney v. Anderson, Dr.
Korn's conduct may also be assessed against the standard of care required
of the reasonable person. As of January 1985, ought the reasonable per-
son to have at least suspected that HIV might be transmitted during an
artificial insemination procedure in which fresh semen was used?16
In order to comment on what the reasonable person ought to have sus-
pected about AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission as of January 1985, I
move beyond medical literature and approach the larger world of media
- newspapers, magazines, television, whatever - that is accessible to,
and indeed unavoidable by, all of us. I considered the coverage of AIDS,
HIV and HIV transmission in the popular Canadian media up to January
1985. It is crucial to bear in mind that Dr. Korn's acts or omissions must
not be assessed against what the reasonable person now ought to suspect
about AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission, but rather against what the rea-
sonable person ought to have suspected as of January 1985. To try to
determine this, I investigated how frequently AIDS, HIV and HIV trans-
mission were considered in the popular media up to January 1985."7 In
particular, I was interested in finding out whether newspaper articles
mentioned semen or sexual contact as a means of HIV transmission and,
if so, how frequently. My principal sources of information were the news-
paper index at the British Columbia Legislature Library (for the years
16. Dr. Korn used only fresh, not frozen, sperm in the artificial insemination proce-
dures performed for the plaintiff: [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 84.
17. I was able to obtain quite comprehensive information concerning newspaper cov-
erage. I obtained some information concerning magazine coverage. I did not even attempt
to determine television or radio coverage. However, the information obtained concerning
newspaper coverage is, I submit, sufficient for the position I argue in this article.
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1981 and 1982) and the Canadian Wire Service computer database for the
years 1983, 1984 and 1985, January only.
Up to and including January 1985, there were at least 784 articles in
Canadian newspapers dealing with AIDS of which at least 60 raised the
possibility that semen or sexual contact were means of AIDS transmis-
sion. While this precise evidence was not before the jury, expert medical
witnesses did testify concerning the "explosion of scientific research and
media coverage ... in 1983-84" concerning AIDS, HIV and HIV trans-
mission.18 The number of relevant articles is summarized in the following
Table:
Year Number of articles Number of articles
concerning AIDS, concerning AIDS,
HIV, and HIV trans- HIV, mentioning pos-
mission sibility that semen or
sexual contact were
means of AIDS trans-
mission
1981 0 0
1982 1 0
1983 389 24
1984 382 32
1985 12 4
(January only)
TOTAL 784 60
Based on this information, I submit that it is misleading to represent
the jury's verdict in Ter Neuzen v. Korn as necessarily indicating that they
must have thought that Dr. Korn ought to have been aware of the letter
to the editor published in the New England Journal of Medicine. Rather,
I submit that by January 1985 the reasonable person ought to have known
that AIDS might be transmitted by semen or sexual contact and therefore
ought to have at least suspected that AIDS might be transmitted during
an artificial insemination procedure in which fresh semen was used. In
particular, this conclusion applies to a person who happens to be a gyne-
cologist. Indeed, during hte proceedings, Dr. Korn admitted that as of
January 1985 he considered AIDS to be a sexually transmitted disease. If
18. [1993] B,C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 12.
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the jury considered the source of Dr. Korn's awareness of AIDS at all, I
submit that it is more reasonable to speculate that they may have thought
of their own awareness, as reasonable people, of the general media cover-
age of AIDS. In this regard, it is interesting to mention that Dr. Korn
testified at trial that in addition to reading medical literature, he learned
about AIDS where everybody else did, namely, in "magazine articles,....
newspaper cuttings, probably television ... [a]ll of the media reports." 19
Dr: Korn appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In its
decision released on June 21, 1993, the Court of Appeal concluded that
the reasonable person standard did not apply in assessing Dr. Korn's
awareness of AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission. The Court stated:20
IT]he evidence established that [as of January 1985] the state of
medical knowledge about AIDS and HIV was highly variable
even between highly qualified scientists. There were differences
of opinion between public health authorities and practitioners in
different medical communities. In our judgment, this was not
the kind of case where a judge could properly instruct the jury
that it could decide that a practice that conformed to what other
practitioners similarly situated were following was negligent.
The only proper instruction to be given on at least [this] part of
the case was that the jury should decide whether the defendant
conducted himself as a reasonable physician would in similar cir-
cumstances. In our judgment, that required the jury to confine
itself to prevailing standards of practice.
With respect, I submit that the logic of the Court of Appeal's reasoning
is flawed. The Court stated in effect that because there was conflicting
medical opinion as to what Dr. Korn's awareness of AIDS as of January
1985 ought to have been, the jury could not be invited to apply the rea-
sonable person standard to that issue. But this is an "apples and oranges"
error. The only inference which the existence of this conflicting evidence
invites is that Dr. Korn was entitled to a verdict that he was not negligent
if the jury accepted any one of the conflicting medical opinions (or, in this
rather complicated case, some weaving together of two or more of the
offered opinions), concluded that the practice represented by that opin-
ion (or combination of opinions) was not itself negligent as determined
by applying the reasonable person standard, and found that Dr. Korn's
practice conformed to that practice. That is, the conflict in the medical
opinion evidence does not render the reasonable person standard irrele-
19. [19931 B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 88.
20. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 144.
HIV and Artificial Insemination
vant. Rather, the applicability of the reasonable person standard de-
pends entirely on the answer to the question: can a nonmedically trained
person understand the facts of the case so that the usual trier of fact (a
jury or a judge) can determine the issue of negligence without deferring
that determination to the profession whose member is alleged to have
been negligent? I submit that the facts in this case, and the conflicting
medical opinions concerning what ought to have been Dr. Korn's aware-
ness of AIDS as of January 1985, are matters which a non-medically
trained person can understand. I submit that the trial judge was, there-
fore, correct in leaving with the jury the possibility that they might deter-
mine, on the reasonable person standard, that any of the doctor
witnesses' standards of AIDS awareness could be rejected as itself negli-
gent. In particular, it is possible that the jury, in determining the content
of the reasonable person standard on this aspect of the case, concluded
that the explosion in media coverage of AIDS, HIV and HIV transmis-
sion, including coverage linking semen or sexual contact with the spread
of AIDS, warranted their finding that Dr. Korn had not met the reason-
able person standard of AIDS awareness.
I submit that the Court of Appeal's rejection of the relevance of the
reasonable person standard on the issue of Dr. Korn's awareness of
AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission may have been in part due to a misap-
plication by it of a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, Lapointe v.
H6pital Le Gardeur (Lapointe).2 The essential facts in this case were as
follows. A five year old girl suffered a serious cut to her elbow which
resulted in extensive blood loss. She was taken to a local hospital where
some treatment was applied. She was then transferred to a pediatric hos-
pital in Montreal. There she suffered cardio-respiratory arrest which re-
sulted in permanent brain damage. The plaintiff patient alleged that the
defendant doctor at the first hospital had been negligent in deciding to
transfer her to the second hospital when he did, in not proceeding to a
blood analysis for typing for transfusion purposes and not transfusing her
before transfer to the second hospital, and in not transmitting sufficient
information to the second hospital.
The patient's action was dismissed at trial. She appealed to the Court
of Appeal for Quebec, which by a majority allowed her appeal. The doc-
tor appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which unanimously al-
21. [19921 1 S.C.R. 351. The Court of Appeal stated: "While [Lapointe] was decided
under the Civil Code of Quebec, we do not understand the law there stated to be different
from the rest of Canada." See [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 98. That assertion is
not contentious.
19941
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lowed his appeal and restored the trial judgment dismissing the patient's
action.
It is worth emphasizing that the only issue in the Supreme Court of
Canada was whether the Court of Appeal had erred in substituting its
findings of fact for those of the trial judge. The Supreme Court held that
it had. The trial judge had not proceeded on the basis of any error of law
and had not made any finding of fact inconsistent with the evidence.
In its reasons in Ter Neuzen v. Korn, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal quoted extensively from Lapointe v. H6pital Le Gardeur22 and
then stated:23
There are cases where it has been decided that a trial judge or
jury is at liberty to find a practice or standard of practice negli-
gent. It is arguable that the passages we have already quoted
from Lapointe seriously weaken the force of these authorities,
particularly where medical science is concerned ....
I submit that it is difficult to know why the Court of Appeal placed such
emphasis on Lapointe (other than that it was the "latest word" from the
Supreme Court on medical negligence) or why it asserted that Lapointe
may have weakened the authority of decisions such as Chasney v. Ander-
son. First, Lapointe said nothing new concerning how to deal with a case
in which there is conflicting medical opinion evidence (which is definitely
not to suggest that something new needed to be said!). L'Heureux-Dub6,
J.'s reasons, for the Court, rely exclusively on previous decisions. Second
and more pertinently to the subject of this article, however, Lapointe said
nothing whatsoever about a case such as Chasney v. Anderson in which
the trier of fact can apply the reasonable person test in determining
whether there was negligence on the part of a doctor. This is not surpris-
ing, since the reasonable person (reasonable juror, reasonable judge) is
incompetent to assess when a seriously injured patient such as the plain-
tiff in Lapointe should be transfused, when blood typing for transfusion
purposes should be done, when she should be transferred from a local
hospital to a pediatric hospital or what information should be transmitted
with her to the receiving hospital. On the other hand, I submit that a
reasonable person (reasonable juror, reasonable judge) is competent,
given the extensiveness and the particular content of the media coverage
of AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission, to conclude that the reasonable
person (including a gynecologist) ought to have suspected that using fresh
22. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 98.
23. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 136.
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semen during an artificial insemination procedure involved the risk of
HIV infection. In short, I submit that on its facts Lapointe is readily dis-
tinguished from Ter Neuzen v. Korn.
The inadequacy of Dr. Korn's awareness of AIDS, HIV and HIV trans-
mission was of course not the only allegation of negligence which Ter
Neuzen made. With respect to Ter Neuzen's other allegations of negli-
gence, the Court of Appeal did hold that the jury could on the evidence
have properly found Dr. Korn negligent in not adequately screening se-
men donors or conducting follow up interviews with them. In this regard,
the Court indicated both that there was expert medical opinion evidence
upon which to base such a finding and also that, perhaps, "the jury could
be given greater latitude in determining the standard of care required on
[these] parts of the case".24 That is, the reasonable person standard
might be applicable to those aspects of the case concerning donor screen-
ing and follow up interviewing.
Of course, the Court of Appeal was in the same position as Dr. Mat6
was and I am, concerning the basis for the jury's finding of negligence
against Dr. Korn: we simply do not know what the basis of that finding
was. However, the Court of Appeal specifically recognized the possibility
that the jury may have rejected the reasonable doctor standard in assess-
ing Dr. Korn's knowledge about AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission and
applied instead the reasonable person standard.25 Given its holding that
this would not have been correct, the Court of Appeal ordered a new
trial.26
The plaintiff is currently seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada.
24. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 152.
25. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 153.
26. [1993] B.C.J. No. 1362 (C.A.), para. 156.
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III. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the ultimate outcome in Ter Neuzen v. Korn, its novel
fact situation provides a vehicle for reminding those confronting medical
negligence issues that a doctor's conduct may be assessed against both the
reasonable doctor standard and the reasonable person standard.27
27. I mention that I searched for decisions in common law jurisdictions other than
British Columbia in which an allegation against a doctor of negligent HIV transmission
during an artificial insemination procedure had been tried. I located only one such case,
namely, Brown v. Shapiro, 472 N.W.2d 247 (1991, Court of Appeal of Wisconsin). In that
case, the plaintiff was administered semen from the same donor twice a month between
August 1986 and April 1987, alternating fresh and frozen semen monthly. Shortly after the
final administration of semen, the donor tested HIV-seropositive. The plaintiff com-
menced her action in September 1990. While she had not seroconverted, evidence indi-
cated that she would continue to be tested for HIV. After a jury trial, the defendant
doctor was held not negligent in his treatment of the plaintiff. The brief reasons of the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals do not touch upon the matter considered in this article.
